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Abstract:  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) adoption on the frequency of earnings management in Russia according to 
accruals-based approach.  
 
The empirical analysis employs the linear regression model which includes a dependent 
variable (discretionary accruals), an independent variable (accounting standards) and some 
control variables.  
 
The sample used for the analysis contains 361 observations of Russian public companies 
from various industries during the period from 2010 to 2015. It is anticipated to obtain the 
result showing that earnings management is intensified after IFRS implementation. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The globalization of the economy necessitates international standardization of 
accounting systems to ensure comparability of reporting between companies of 
different countries. It is expected that financial reporting under IFRS will not only 
ensure comparability of financial statements of companies from different countries, 
but will also contribute to improving the quality of information provided in the 
statements. This is determined by the concept of IFRS, being Principles-Based 
Standards, which, in fact, allow for a certain amount of flexibility, enabling 
accountants and managers to apply professional judgment in the formation of 
individual financial reporting indicators, thereby reflecting the actual state of the 
company's affairs. In other words, when applying IFRS, managers can use their 
knowledge of the business to choose the ways of presenting information and offer 
their own professional assessments that best describe the specifics of business 
processes and increase the value of accounting as a form of communication. 
However, due to the imperfection of the existing controls over the issued financial 
statements, in particular, from the auditors, there is a risk that managers will apply 
this freedom to misstate the company's financial performance. 
 
The ambiguity and inconsistency of the results of studies on the impact of IFRS 
application on the level of the net profit index divergence for different countries and 
samples necessitates a detailed analysis of the problem, taking into account possible 
factors influencing the effect of IFRS application, the specifics of the country in 
question (Russia) and various methods for assessing the level of earnings 
management. It is also worth noting that, despite a large number of scientific papers 
analyzing developed and developing countries, such a study was not conducted in 
the Russian market, which also indicates the relevance of this research.  
 
The purpose of this work is to investigate the direction and extent of influence of 
IFRS application on the profit index divergence in the Russian market. The database 
of Bureau van Dijk (Amadeus) was taken as a research information base. 
 
The results of this study show an increase in misstatement due to IFRS application; 
accordingly, the practical application of the results involves the need to consider the 
risk of presenting inaccurate information in the financial statements prepared in 
accordance with IFRS, when investors make decisions based on such reporting. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
2.1 Incentives and limitations for earnings management 
 
Many existing empirical studies in this area seek to obtain empirical evidence that 
the company's management provides earnings management, guided by certain 
motives. Based on the existing papers dealing with the influence of various factors 
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on the level of misstatement of financial indicators, the following motives can be 
distinguished: 
 
1. Aspiration of top executives to receive a bonus award, depending on certain 
financial indicators of the company (Healy, 1985). 
2. The desire to influence the companies' stock prices during the IPO (Teoh et al., 
1998). 
3. The desire to ensure compliance of the company's financial results with the 
forecasts of analysts (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Kasznik, 1999). 
4. The intention to fulfill the terms of the loan agreement (DeFond and Jimbalo, 
1994). 
5. The desire to reduce tax payments (Goncharov and Zimmermann, 2007; Coopens 
and Peek, 2005). 
At the same time, the company deliberately falsifies the profit performance only if it 
has the opportunity to do so. However, there are some limitations that deter 
companies from deliberately misstating financial reporting data. The developed 
system of corporate governance and control, as well as a high degree of regulation of 
audit activities and protection of investors' rights are examples of the main 
limitations. The results of previous studies indicate that for countries with developed 
institutions for protecting investors' rights and, as a consequence, a high level of 
control over the activities of audit firms, the level of misstatement is much lower.  
 
In addition, the quality of the audit is particularly important: the results of previous 
studies (Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004, Chen et al., 2005, Wanqing, 2014) show 
that companies audited by Big 4 accounting firms demonstrate a lower level of 
earnings management compared to companies audited by non-Big 4 firms. The 
circulation of shares of companies in foreign stock markets is another constraining 
factor (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Moreover, it is assumed that large companies 
are less prone to misstating the profit performance due to the fact that such 
companies have more sophisticated and perfect internal control systems, and they 
value their reputation more. The fact that the size of the company is a constraining 
factor to falsification is confirmed in the works of Lennox (1999) and Beasley and 
coauthors (2000).  
 
However, at the same time, large companies are more exposed to pressure from 
capital markets (Rangan, 1998; Nelson, 2002; Liapis and Thalassinos, 2013) and 
have greater negotiating power with firms providing audit services for relatively 
small companies (Barton and Simko, 2002). Thus, the influence of company's size 
on the level of the profit index divergence is very ambiguous. It is also worth noting 
that in Russia the institutes of control over auditing activities and institutes of 
investors' rights protection are extremely undeveloped, and therefore, despite the 
existing limitations, managers may have the opportunity to falsify the company's 
financial results. 
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2.2 The relationship between the IFRS adoption and the earnings management 
level  
 
The paper of Callao and Jarne (2007) is one of the key studies examining the impact 
of IFRS on earnings management The author shows that for companies applying 
IFRS, the level of the profit index divergence is higher than for companies that apply 
national accounting standards. A similar result was obtained in a study by Lopes and 
coauthors (2010) using the Kothari model (Kothari et al., 2005). The hypothesis that 
IFRS increases the profit index divergence is also confirmed by Campa and 
Donnelly (2011) and by Wanqing (2014) applying the Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995). 
 
However, there are a number of studies that cast doubt on the results of the studies 
considered earlier. Thus, in (Cai et al., 2008) the authors obtain a significant 
negative coefficient in their regression model, which indicates a decrease in the level 
of the profit index divergence due to the application of IFRS. The hypothesis that the 
use of IFRS reduces the frequency of financial reporting data misstatement is also 
confirmed by Sellami and Fakhfakh (2014). A similar result was obtained by 
Pelucio-Grecco (2014). 
 
Along with the above papers, there are a number of studies, the results of which 
indicate the insignificant effect of IFRS adoption on the level of earnings 
management or the absence of such influence (Besten, 2012). In addition, the 
hypothesis about the absence of the effect of IFRS adoption on the level of earnings 
management is confirmed in the study by Umobong and Akani (2015). The results 
of the study by Monzano (2014) show that the level of earnings management, on the 
contrary, is higher for companies applying IFRS. However, as in the previous 
studies, the resulting coefficient is insignificant, therefore, the hypothesis of an 
increase in earnings management due to IFRS adoption should be rejected. 
 
3. Formulation of the research hypotheses 
 
Based on the analysis of existing studies, it is proposed to verify the following 
hypotheses in the framework of this paper:  
 
Hypothesis 1: It is expected that IFRS adoption increases the level of the profit index 
divergence due to the fact that international standards provide managers a greater 
opportunity to apply their professional judgment in the formation of certain reporting 
parameters, though there are problems of imperfection control over the issued 
statements and poorly developed institutions for investor rights protection. Thus, 
despite the existing limitations, managers retain the possibility for intentional 
misstatement of the company's financial results.  
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Hypothesis 2: It is assumed that IFRS adoption contributes to the increase in 
divergence towards overestimation to a greater extent than toward the 
underestimation of profits, since a voluntary transition to IFRS implies the attraction 
of investors as its main objective. Thus, companies applying IFRS have more 
incentives to overestimate profits. 
  
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which IFRS adoption affects the profit index divergence 
depends on the quality of the audit. It is assumed that companies audited by Big 4 
accounting firms demonstrate a lower level of earnings management compared to 
companies audited by non-Big 4 firms, that is, the quality of the audit is a 
constraining factor of earnings management. 
  
Hypothesis 4: The degree of influence of IFRS adoption on the earnings 
management does not depend on the company size. 
 
4. Material and Methods  
 
4.1 Measurement of the level of profit index divergence  
 
As noted above, it is assumed to use discretionary accruals as a proxy variable to 
detect opportunistic behavior of management, namely, the fact of profit divergence. 
Discretionary accruals are not a mandatory part of the operating activities of 
companies and arise because managers use their own professional judgments. Since 
the discretionary accruals are a direct evaluation of management, supposedly trying 
to "mask" the urgent problems of the company, this value is considered as a proxy 
for earnings management. 
 
In this paper, the Modified Jones Model developed by Dechow et al. (1995) will be 
used to find the level of discretionary accruals as a priority method from a number of 
others offered by Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones Model (1991),  Kothari and 
coauthors (2005). The choice of this model for estimating the level of the profit 
index divergence in the framework of this paper is determined by the following 
reasons.  
 
First, the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995), unlike the approaches of 
Healy (1985) and De Angelo (1986), does not consider the amount of non-
discretionary accruals to be constant and takes into account the contribution to 
discretionary accruals that can be introduced at the expense of the industry or a 
certain year.  
 
Second, unlike the above models, the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 1995) 
uses scaling on total assets, which eliminates the heteroscedasticity problem. In 
addition, when applying the modified model, unlike the Kothari method (Kothari et 
al., 2005), there is no need to select an analogue company, which makes it possible 
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not to narrow the sample. It is also worth noting that the Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) has more test power and better explains the dependent 
variable than the simple Jones model (Jones, 1991). 
The determination of the level of discretionary accruals in accordance with the 
chosen model is carried out in several steps: 
 
1. The OLS method is used to estimate the following regression: 
 
      
where  – total accruals over the period t;  change in the company's 
revenues over the period t as compared to the previous one;  change in 
company's receivables over the period t as compared to the previous one;  
the gross property, plant, and equipment as of the end of the period t;  total 
assets at t-1; – model coefficients;  regression model error. Total 
accruals are calculated by formula:  
 
,                    
 
where  - change in current assets and current liabilities over the 
period t;   change in cash over the period t;    – change in debt 
included in current liabilities over the period t. 
 
Knowing model coefficients , , , it is possible to calculate the value of non-
discretionary accruals which equal to ,  
 
where  , , 
.  
2. The level of discretionary accruals is calculated, being a proxy for profit index 
divergence (earnings management), as the difference between the total amount of 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals, which corresponds to the remainders of the 
regression. 
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4.2 Regression models of the dependence of earnings management on IFRS 
adoption 
 
At this stage of the study, for testing Hypothesis 1, according to which IFRS 
adoption increases the level of the profit index divergence, it is proposed to 
construct an OLS regression of the dependence of discretionary accruals as a proxy 
of earnings management on the applied accounting standard. 
 
The amount of discretionary accruals (DA) taken in modulus serves as a dependent 
variable. The applicable accounting standard is an explanatory variable: if the 
company applies IFRS, the explanatory dummy variable of IFRS is set to 1, and if 
the company uses Russian Accounting Standards, the IFRS dummy variable is set to 
0. The dummy-variable Big4 is another explanatory variable that is set to 1 if the 
audit is conducted by a Big Four auditing firm and 0 if the auditing firm does not 
belong to the Big Four. The expected sign of the coefficient before the Big4 variable 
is negative. The following variables were selected as the control ones: 
 
1. The size of the company (SIZE), calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
company's total assets. As noted above, the effect of this factor on the level of the 
profit index divergence is ambiguous, thus, the coefficient sign in front of the SIZE 
variable is not defined at this stage. 
2. Ratio of total liabilities to total assets (LEV). It is expected that the coefficient 
before this variable will have a positive sign. This dependence can be explained as 
follows: the ratio of liabilities to total assets demonstrates what part of the assets is 
financed by the company's loans; the higher this indicator, the greater the company's 
desire to fulfill the terms of the loan agreement, therefore, in this case, top managers 
are more prone to earnings management with the purpose to ensure the financial 
result necessary to enter into a loan agreement or ensure its continuation, as 
confirmed by Bauwhede et al. (2003), Jelinek (2007), Callao (2010) and Wanqing 
(2014). 
3. The risk variable (LOSS) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if in the period t-1 Net 
Income takes a negative value, and 0 if in the period t-1 Net Income is non-negative. 
It is assumed that if the company demonstrated a loss in the previous period, the top 
managers will be less inclined to earnings management (Francis and Yu, 2009). This 
is explained by the fact that companies that have a positive net profit in the previous 
period are more inclined to misstate with the purpose to justify the expectations of 
shareholders and investors, while companies showing a negative financial result in 
the previous year do not have such an incentive, as the expectations of shareholders 
and investors are no longer justified. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient in 
front of the LOSS variable is positive. 
4. Percentage change in income (GROWTH). It is expected that the sign of the 
coefficient in front of this variable in the regression will be positive, as the market 
has higher expectations for fast-growing companies, which serves as an additional 
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incentive for misstating the data of financial statements by the managers (Skinner 
and Sloan, 2002; McNichols, 2000) 
5. ROE – in accordance with Freeman's fundamental work (Freeman et al, 1982), 
fluctuations in the profit index and return on equity have a negative correlation. It is 
assumed that the coefficient in front of the ROE variable is negative. 
 
In addition, since the sample includes companies from different industries, it is 
justified to include industrial dummies in regression as control variables. 
 
Thus, the regression for assessing the impact of IFRS adoption on the level of the 
profit index divergence in the framework of testing of Hypothesis 1 is written as: 
 
 
 
An empirical study based on this model will reveal the direction of the influence of 
the applied accounting standard on the level of the profit index divergence and 
determine whether the explanatory variable of IFRS is significant. 
 
To test Hypothesis 2, according to which the effect of IFRS adoption differs between 
divergence towards overestimation of profits and divergence towards 
underestimation of profits, it is assumed to divide a sample into two subsamples:  
 
1) with the level of discretionary accruals ≥0;  
2) with the level of discretionary accruals <0. Further, the regression constructed for 
testing Hypothesis 1 is evaluated for each individual subsample, as a result of which 
the coefficients obtained in front of the IFRS variable and their significance are 
compared and it is determined whether the effect of IFRS adoption for two 
subsamples differs. 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, according to which the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management differs for companies audited by Big 4 firms, and for companies 
audited by non-Big 4 firms, the IFRS*Big 4 variable is added to the original 
regression model: 
 
    
Empirical research on the basis of this model will reveal whether the degree of the 
impact of IFRS adoption on the level of profit index divergence differs depending on 
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audit quality. It is assumed that the coefficient is significant, which may be 
interpreted as follows: the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management differs 
for companies audited by Big 4 firms, and for companies audited by non-Big4 firms. 
To test the Hypotheses 4, according to which the extent of the impact of IFRS 
adoption on the profit index divergence does not depend on the company size, the 
IFRS*SIZE variable should be added in the original model. Thus, in the framework 
of testing Hypothesis 4 the model for estimating by the OLS method is written as: 
 
    
Whether the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management differs for large and 
small firms can be established similarly: by determining the significance of the 
IFRS*SIZE coefficient. In the present study, it is assumed that the coefficient 
obtained is insignificant. 
 
4.3 Description of the sample 
 
To include observations in the final sample, the following conditions should be met: 
• The company is public; 
• Discretionary accruals can be calculated for the company in accordance with the  
   Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995);  
• The company has available data on the applicable accounting standard (RAS or  
   IFRS); 
• There are data whether the company is audited by one of the Big Four firms; 
• There are disclosed data that are necessary to determine the control variables of the  
   regression for the company. 
 
As a result, 361 company-year observations (an average of 60 companies) 
correspond to the indicated criteria. The Amadeus industry breakdown was used for 
further analysis of companies by industry – Mining and quarrying; Manufacturing; 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; Construction; Wholesale and 
retail trade; Transportation and storage; Information and communication; Financial 
and insurance activities; Real estate activities; Professional, scientific and technical 
activities. For the distribution of companies from the sample by sector, see Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Industry breakdown for the companies of the final sample.  
Industry Amount of companies Frequency 
Mining and quarrying 3 5% 
Manufacturing 9 15% 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 18 30% 
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supply 
Civil engineering 2 3% 
Wholesale and retail trade 4 7% 
Transportation and storage 3 5% 
Information and communication 6 10% 
Financial and insurance activities 9 15% 
Real estate activities 2 3% 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 5 8% 
Total 61 100% 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
For 361 company-year observations in accordance with the algorithm described 
above, the amount of discretionary accruals was calculated as a proxy of earnings 
management. In order to assess the main regression model of the research, the level 
of discretionary accruals was taken in modulus. It is believed that the stronger the 
deviation from zero, the more significant the distortion. Also for testing Hypothesis 
2, the sample was divided into two subsamples: 1) with the level of discretionary 
accruals ≥0 and 2) with the level of discretionary accruals <0. It can be seen from 
Figure 1 that in 2012 the level of discretionary accruals in absolute terms increases 
in comparison with previous periods, which (FZ-208, 2010), whereby earnings 
management rate increased, which corresponds to the main hypothesis of this study.  
 
It is worth noting that in 2014 the level of earnings management was the most 
significant, which can be explained by the crisis, as a result of which the financial 
results of many companies deteriorated significantly and the executives of such 
companies were forced to intentionally falsify the reporting data in order to hide the 
generated problems from investors. Figure 1 also shows that during the period under 
consideration the trend line is upward, which also does not contradict the hypothesis 
of increasing earnings management due to IFRS adoption. 
 
The descriptive statistics given in Table 2 allows analyzing how discretionary 
accruals and other parameters of the regression model differ between the companies 
adopting IFRS and companies that report only in accordance with RAS. As a result 
of the sample breakdown based on the accounting standard used, 287 and 74 
observations for IFRS and RAS statements were obtained, respectively. It should be 
noted that according to the statistics presented in Table 2, about 66% of companies 
using IFRS are audited by Big 4 firms, while only 47% of companies applying 
Russian Accounting Standards are audited by the Big Four firms. 
 
Also, according to the results of the descriptive statistics, the companies preparing 
IFRS reporting are characterized by a large size, smaller growth relative to the 
previous period, more frequent past loss events and a lower ROE level than the 
companies applying RAS. The data of the presented descriptive statistics also 
indicate that the level of discretionary accruals for the companies applying IFRS is 
on average slightly higher than for the companies using RAS (0.18 for IFRS, 0.12 
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for RAS), which confirms the assumption that the IFRS adoption increases the profit 
index divergence. 
 
Figure 1. Dynamics of discretionary accruals in the period from 2010 to 2015 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the main regression parameters broken down by 
the applicable standards  
  Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
IFRS        N=287         
DA_abs 0.1751 0.1556 0.1743 0.0006 1.9811 
BIG4 0.6620 1 0.4738 0 1 
SIZE 15.0205 14.8694 1.7294 9.1346 19.5231 
LEV 0.2651 0.2198 0.1854 0.0081 0.8483 
LOSS 0.2021 0 0.4023 0 1 
GROWTH 0.0474 -0.0321 0.7013 -1 8.5587 
ROE 6.9977 9.64 24.4969 -156.72 93.48 
RAS        N=74         
DA_abs 0.1216 0.1215 0.0758 0.0010 0.2882 
BIG4 0.4730 0 0.5027 0 1 
SIZE 14.7274 14.6525 1.0868 11.5985 17.3083 
LEV 0.2319 0.1759 0.1670 0.0363 0.9588 
LOSS 0.1351 0 0.3442 0 1 
GROWTH 0.3266 0.2528 0.5036 -0.5201 3.2050 
ROE 9.9016 9.52 13.6870 -48.57 49.36 
p < 0.1 - *, p < 0.05 - **, p < 0.01 - *** 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
The results of testing Hypothesis 1 are given in Table 3. The results indicate that the 
estimated regression as a whole is statistically significant. In addition, the R-square 
indicates a sufficient accuracy of approximation and good predictive power. In 
accordance with the results presented in Table 3, the IFRS variable is significant at a 
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significance level of 1% (p-value is 6.00E-09). The resulting coefficient in front of 
the variable under consideration is positive.  
 
Thus, the IFRS variable has a strong positive influence on discretionary accruals, 
which leads to the conclusion that Hypothesis 1 is not rejected. As a result of 
regression estimate for testing Hypothesis 1, the BIG4, SIZE and GROWTH 
variables are also statistically significant at a significance level of 1%. The 
coefficient in front of the BIG4 variable is negative, which confirms the assumption 
that companies audited by the Big 4 firms demonstrate a lower level of misstating 
the financial reporting data due to the high quality of the audit. The coefficient 
obtained in front of the SIZE variable is also negative, which can be interpreted as 
follows: large companies resort to earnings management to a lesser extent than small 
companies. 
 
The coefficient in front of the GROWTH variable, as expected, has a positive sign, 
confirming the assumption that the market has higher expectations for fast-growing 
companies, which serves as an additional incentive for earnings management.  
 
Table 3. The results of the regression for testing Hypothesis 1 
  Coefficients Standard error t-statistics P-Value 
IFRS      0.1050*** 0.0176 5.9634 6.00E-09 
BIG4    `-0.1427*** 0.0149 -9.5867 1.69E-19 
SIZE    `-0.0125*** 0.0046 -2.7112 0.0070 
LEV -0.0412 0.0400 -1.0320 0.3028 
LOSS -0.0024 0.0229 -0.1058 0.9158 
GROWTH      0.0737*** 0.0104 7.0585 8.97E-12 
ROE -0.0004 0.0004 -1.1279 0.2601 
N 361    
R-squared 0.3378    
p < 0.1 - *, p < 0.05 - **, p < 0.01 - *** 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
The LEV, LOSS and ROE variables are statistically insignificant at any adequate 
level of significance (p-value > 0.1). Signs of the coefficients in front of the LOSS 
and ROE variables correspond to the assumptions. Thus, the coefficient sign in front 
of the LOSS variable is negative, that is, companies that have a negative indicator of 
net profit in the previous period tend to earnings management to a lesser extent, 
because the companies that showed a negative financial result in the previous year 
do not have to justify the expectations of shareholders and investors, since their 
expectations are no longer justified. The coefficient in front of the ROE variable has 
a negative sign, which does not contradict the logic according to which the 
fluctuation of the profit index and the return on equity have a negative correlation. 
The assumption regarding the coefficient sign in front of the LEV variable was not 
confirmed – the coefficient has a negative sign; however the variable is insignificant, 
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therefore, this discrepancy will not be taken into account. To test Hypothesis 2, the 
sample was divided into two subsamples: 1) with a discretionary accruals level ≥ 0 
(75 observations), and 2) with a discretionary level of <0 (286 observations). The 
results of the regression estimate for the subsample with the level of discretionary 
accruals ≥ 0 are given in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. The results of the regression for testing Hypothesis 2 on the entire sample. 
Divergence toward profit overstatement 
  Coefficients Standard error t-statistics P-Value 
IFRS     0.1595*** 0.0518 3.0811 0.0030 
BIG4     -0.1544*** 0.0566 -2.7267 0.0082 
SIZE     -0.0621*** 0.0194 -3.1978 0.0021 
LEV -0.1705 0.1238 -1.3774 0.1730 
LOSS -0.0871 0.0956 -0.9115 0.3653 
GROWTH     0.1534*** 0.0318 4.8173 8.68E-06 
ROE -0.0014 0.0017 -0.8754 0.3845 
N 75    
R-squared 0.4901    
p < 0.1 - *, p < 0.05 - **, p < 0.01 - *** 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
The results showed that the coefficient in front of the IFRS variable is significant at 
any adequate level of significance. Thus, the IFRS variable has a strong positive 
impact on discretionary accruals, i.e., IFRS adoption significantly increases the 
profit index divergence towards overestimation. The results of the regression 
estimate for the subsample with discretionary accruals <0 are given in Table 5, and 
the coefficient in front of the IFRS variable is also significant at any level. Since 
discretionary accruals in this subsample have a negative sign, the negative value of 
the coefficient in front of the IFRS variable can be interpreted as an increase in the 
profit index divergence towards the underestimation due to IFRS adoption.  
 
When comparing the coefficients in front of the variable under consideration in two 
subsamples, it is obvious that the IFRS has a greater effect on the divergence 
towards overstatement of profits than towards their understatement, which 
corresponds to Hypothesis 2. This result is explained by the fact that the voluntary 
transition to IFRS is mainly aimed at attracting investors, and, accordingly, 
companies that adopt IFRS have an additional incentive to overvalue profits. Since 
this hypothesis is considered in the context of a voluntary transition to IFRS, the 
period in which IFRS adoption became mandatory (2012) and all subsequent periods 
were excluded from the sample, after which the hypothesis was verified specifically 
for data on the companies that adopted IFRS voluntarily.  
 
Thus, the new sample within the framework of additional testing of Hypothesis 2 
consisted of 118 observations in the period from 2010 to 2011, 47 of which related 
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to the subsampling with overstatement of profits and 71 observations refer to 
understatement of profits. Further regression models were estimated for the two 
subsamples separately. The resulting coefficient in front of the IFRS variable for the 
subsample with the divergence toward overstatement of profits in the period from 
2010 to 2011 is statistically significant at all levels.  
 
The coefficient in front of the same variable for the subsample with divergence 
towards the understatement of profits in the period from 2010 to 2011 is significant 
at 5% significance level (p-value is 0.0198). Since the discretionary accruals in this 
subsample are <0, the negative value of the coefficient in front of the IFRS variable 
can be interpreted as an increase in the level of divergence towards the 
understatement of profits due to IFRS adoption. 
 
Table 5. The results of the regression for testing Hypothesis 2 on the entire sample 
Divergence toward profit understatement 
  Coefficients Standard error t-statistics P-Value 
IFRS     -0.0782*** 0.0148 -5.295 2.42E-07 
BIG4      0.1220*** 0.0116 10.547 4.27E-22 
SIZE   0.0069* 0.0035 1.951 0.0520 
LEV -0.0450 0.0330 -1.363 0.1741 
LOSS -0.0250 0.0172 -1.454 0.1471 
GROWTH     -0.0373*** 0.0096 -3.894 0.0001 
ROE -0.0001 0.0003 -0.222 0.8244 
N 286       
R-squared 0.3871       
p < 0.1 - *, p < 0.05 - **, p < 0.01 - *** 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
The results of testing Hypothesis 3 are given in Table 6. The regression estimated by 
the OLS method is statistically significant in general. The resulting coefficient in 
front of the IFRS*BIG4 variable has a negative sign. This variable is significant, 
therefore, the IFRS*BIG4 variable has a negative impact on the discretionary 
accruals, which leads to the conclusion that though in general the IFRS contributes 
to an increase in earnings management, for companies audited by the Big Four firms, 
this effect is not confirmed – the quality of the audit restrains earnings management 
despite the application of international standards. 
 
Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not rejected – the effect of IFRS adoption on profit divergence 
is different for companies audited by Big 4 firms, and for companies audited by non-
Big firms. It should be noted that, in accordance with the results given in Table 6, 
the signs of coefficients and the significance of the remaining variables are 
equivalent to the results of previous regressions. 
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Table 6. The results of the regression for testing Hypothesis 3 
  Coefficients Standard error t-statistics P-Value 
IFRS      0.1432*** 0.0249 5.7558 1.88E-08 
BIG4      -0.0851*** 0.0305 -2.7916 0.0055 
BIG4*IFRS    -0.0765** 0.0354 -2.1632 0.0312 
SIZE    -0.0103** 0.0047 -2.1813 0.0298 
LEV  -0.0368 0.0398 -0.9248 0.3557 
LOSS 0.0007 0.0228 0.0296 0.9764 
GROWTH     0.0719*** 0.0104 6.9046 2.36E-11 
ROE -0.0004 0.0004 -1.1501 0.2509 
N 361    
R-squared 0.3446    
p < 0.1 - *, p < 0.05 - **, p < 0.01 - *** 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
The results of testing Hypotheses 4 on the basis of the regression model with the 
addition of the IFRS*SIZE variable are given in Table 7. These results show the 
statistical significance of the model as a whole. The regression estimation has 
demonstrated that the coefficient in front of the IFRS*SIZE variable is negative, 
which means that for large companies, IFRS adoption does not increase the profit 
index divergence to the extent as it is increased for small firms.  
 
However, the variable is insignificant at any adequate level of significance. Thus, it 
cannot be concluded that the effect of IFRS adoption on the level of earnings 
management is different for large and small firms, i.e., Hypothesis 4 is not rejected – 
the degree of influence of IFRS adoption on profit index divergence does not depend 
on the company size. As can be seen from Table 7, the signs of the coefficients and 
the significance of the remaining variables are consistent with the results of previous 
regressions. 
 
Table 7. The results of the regression for testing Hypothesis 4 
  Coefficients Standard error t-statistics P-Value 
IFRS 0.2543 0.2229 1.1405 0.2549 
SIZE -0.0034 0.0143 -0.2401 0.8104 
SIZE*IFRS -0.0102 0.0151 -0.6718 0.5022 
BIG4    -0.1410*** 0.0151 -9.3253 1.26E-18 
LEV -0.0414 0.0400 -1.0344 0.3017 
LOSS -0.0026 0.0229 -0.1121 0.9108 
GROWTH     0.0729*** 0.0105 6.9316 2.00E-11 
ROE -0.0004 0.0004 -1.1095 0.2680 
N 361    
R-squared 0.3367    
p < 0.1 - *, p < 0.05 - **, p < 0.01 - *** 
Source: compiled by the author 
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6. Conclusion  
 
As a result of the conducted empirical study based on the construction of regression 
models, all the hypotheses put forward were not rejected. The data verification 
revealed only the problem of heteroscedasticity, however after applying the method 
of scaling variables, the errors turned out to be homoscedastic, and repeated 
regression analysis based on new scaled variables showed findings similar to the 
initial ones. Thus, it can be concluded that the results of testing the hypotheses of the 
study are correct. 
 
Since the present study revealed an increase in the propensity to misstate the profit 
index due to IFRS adoption, the practical significance lies in the fact that these 
findings should be taken into account by investors in making decisions based on 
IFRS reporting: the existing and potential investors should account for the risk of 
disclosing inadequate information in such statements. 
 
It is worth noting the existing limitations of this study and further possible directions 
of research on the problem of the interrelation of IFRS adoption and the degree of 
the profit index divergence. First, the sample used in this study is limited to a time 
period of 6 years, which is determined by the limited amount of available data from 
the research information base. Second, this paper considers only one method for 
estimating the profit index divergence – the Modified Jones Model, but it is also 
advisable to use an alternative model developed by Kothari, which requires the 
selection of an analogue company and is not applied in this study due to the 
insufficiency of observations in the sample. 
 
Third, at this stage, the amount of data available does not allow investigating 
whether the effect of IFRS adoption differs from the level of earnings management, 
depending on whether the company's shares circulate on foreign stock markets. In 
this regard, the testing of this hypothesis can be considered in further studies on the 
impact of IFRS adoption on the earnings management. 
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